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Abstract
In a User-Private Information Retrieval (UPIR) scheme, a set of users
collaborate to retrieve files from a database without revealing to observers
which participant in the scheme requested the file. Protocols have been
proposed based on pairwise balanced designs and symmetric designs. We
propose a new class of UPIR schemes based on generalised quadrangles
(GQ).
We prove that while the privacy of users in the previously proposed
schemes could be compromised by a single user, the new GQ-UPIR schemes
proposed in this paper maintain privacy with high probability even when
up to O(n1/4−) users collude, where n is the total number of users in the
scheme.
1 Introduction
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) allows a user to retrieve information from a
database without revealing which information was requested. A trivial solution
is for the user to download all of the information on the database, but when
the information is replicated in multiple locations, more efficient schemes are
known [1,3, 5].
A slightly different approach to the problem of private information retrieval
attempts to hide the identity of the user downloading a file. One approach to
this problem is Onion Routing [11]. An onion is a recursively encrypted data
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Figure 1: A visualisation of a UPIR system.
packet, which encodes a path through a network of cooperating users. Each user
in the path removes the outermost layer of encryption, and forwards the onion
to the next user on the path. The onion carries no identifying features, which
would allow an observer to identify it with different outer layers. Anonymity
is achieved in this system by choosing sufficiently long paths at random for the
onions.
One disadvantage of onion routing is that the number of times a message
is passed between users can be large. This results in a low throughput of data
when bandwidth in the network is limited. User-Private Information Retrieval
(UPIR) is an approach to private information retrieval in which the identities of
users are hidden, but the number of times a message is forwarded through the
network is tightly controlled. To achieve privacy in a UPIR scheme, it is usual
to place strong restrictions on which users can communicate with one another
within the scheme.
Definition 1 (cf. Section 2, [9]). A UPIR system consists of a bipartite graph
(U ∪M, E), where U is the set of users and M is the set of message spaces.
A user u ∈ U has access to a message space M ∈ M if (u,M) is in the set of
edges E. Furthermore it is assumed that all users have access to a database
that evaluates queries.
Example 1. Figure 1 shows a UPIR system with 5 users and 3 message spaces
and the incidence matrix of the corresponding bipartite graph.
A common requirement in earlier work is that every pair of users share access
to a common message space. Here, we require only that the bipartite graph
underlying the UPIR scheme is connected; we say that such a UPIR system is
connected. If u is incident with M , then user u can both write messages to M
and read any messages written to M ; if u is not incident with M then u has no
access to M . Users communicate within the scheme only by writing messages to
one another in the message spaces. Any user may send queries to the database
for evaluation. Users preserve their privacy by passing requests via the message
spaces to other users to act as proxies for them.
In order for users to communicate using a UPIR system, a protocol is re-
quired; one example is described explicitly below. We refer to the combination
of a UPIR system and a protocol as a UPIR scheme. This distinction is helpful
in illustrating the interactions between the combinatorics of the bipartite graph
and the privacy properties of the protocol.
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Protocol 1. Let (U ∪M, E) be a connected UPIR system. Suppose that user
u wishes to retrieve the response to the query Q from the database.
1. User u chooses a user v uniformly at random from the set of all users.
2. If u = v, u requests Q directly from the server, receiving response R.
3. Otherwise, u chooses a shortest path (u,M1, u1, . . . ,Mn, v) from u to v in the
bipartite graph.
4. User u writes a request [(u1,M2, . . . ,Mn, v), Q] onto M1.
5. For i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, user ui observes the request [(ui,Mi+1, . . . ,Mn, v), Q]
addressed to him in Mi. He writes a new request [(ui+1,Mi+2, . . . ,Mn, v), Q] to
Mi+1.
6. When the message [(v), Q] reaches message space Mn, user v sees it and forwards
Q to the database. User v writes the response R from the database as [(v), Q,R]
in Mn.
7. User uj , upon seeing the response [(uj+1,Mj+2, . . . , v), Q,R] in Mj+1, writes
the response [(uj ,Mj , uj+1, . . . , v), Q,R] to Mj .
8. User u receives the response R to his query after u1 writes [(u1,M2, . . . , v), Q,R]
to M1.
Remark 1. Many variations of Protocol 1 are possible, including randomising
the path, and alterations to save used memory. Such changes do not alter the
results in the following sections. Any user with access to a message space Mi
on the path can observe the request, the identity of the proxy and the response;
but gains limited information about the source of the request.
Domingo-Ferrer, Stokes, Bras-Amoro´s, and co-authors introduced UPIR sys-
tems and analysed a protocol where users write queries to message spaces with-
out specifying a proxy [4, 8], while a special case of the above protocol was
developed by Swanson and Stinson [9, 10]. Both groups of authors worked on
UPIR systems derived from highly structured set systems. In particular, they
required that every pair of users share a common message space, in which case
Protocol 1 can be implemented so that every path has length at most 2: any
user can write requests directly to his chosen proxy.
Stokes and Bras-Amoro´s considered the problem of constructing a UPIR
system under the restrictions that deg(M) is constant for all message spaces
M , [8]. This requirement can be interpreted as balancing the load amongst
message spaces. They also require that every pair of users share precisely one
message space. After rejecting some degenerate solutions in which message
spaces have size 1, 2, n − 1 or n; the authors are left with precisely the class
of finite projective planes. We recall that a projective plane is a combinatorial
structure consisting of points and blocks in which
1. Every pair of points is contained in a unique block
2. Every pair of blocks intersect in a unique point
3. There exist 4 points, no three contained in any block
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Projective planes have a rich theory playing an important role in combinatorics,
geometry and algebra. Inspired by Stokes and Bras-Amoro´s, Swanson and Stin-
son analysed attacks on projective plane UPIR systems, and proposed UPIR
systems constructed from a broader class of block designs. In particular, they
considered balanced incomplete block designs and pairwise balanced designs
(PBD). The monograph by Beth, Jungnickel and Lenz is a standard reference
for design theory [2].
In the next section, we will show that observers in a UPIR system have
an advantage in gathering information about users with whom they share a
message space. Motivated by this result, we consider the next obvious class of
UPIR systems; those in which users are separated by a path of length at most
2. A natural class of examples are furnished by finite generalised quadrangles.
Furthermore we consider a different protocol, based on onion routing, and prove
that it aids privacy.
2 Privacy in a UPIR system
It is assumed throughout that the content of any message space is only available
to the users who have access to the given message space as in Protocol 1. An
external eavesdropper, i.e., someone who is not a user in the system, can observe
the requests made to the database, since these are not encrypted, but cannot
read messages sent between users. Security in this setting has been studied
previously in [9] and their result forms the basis of any UPIR scheme.
Definition 2. A UPIR system is private with respect to external observers if,
for any request Q forwarded to the database by user v, we have that
P(u is the source of Q | v is the proxy) = P(u is the source of Q) .
Swanson and Stinson have proved that the obvious strategy in which users
select proxies uniformly at random is sufficient for privacy against external ob-
servers.
Theorem 1 (Theorems 6.1, 6.2 [9]). A connected UPIR scheme is private
against external observers if each user chooses proxies uniformly at random,
and the proxies for distinct queries are chosen independently.
Protocol 1 can be implemented on any connected UPIR scheme; and Theo-
rem 1 shows that the scheme is private against external observers.
More recent research on UPIR has aimed at preserving privacy with respect
to other users in the UPIR scheme, under the assumption that users are honest
but curious. That is, they act according to Protocol 1, but they may attempt
to determine the source of any queries that they observe.
Since the message space into which a request is written already reveals non-
trivial information about the source of the request, perfect privacy with respect
to other users is, in general, impossible. For example: in a PBD-UPIR scheme,
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it can be inferred that the source of a request written to the message space M
is a user with access to M .
First, we develop a criterion for judging whether a UPIR system is secure in
terms of maintaining users’ privacy. Our analysis will be based on linked queries,
which are a series of queries which are identifiable as coming from a single source.
These were first introduced by Swanson and Stinson, who provided the example
of a series of requests for information about a fixed, obscure topic [9].
Definition 3. Let C be a coalition of users, collaborating to identify the source
of a series of linked queries. Users u and v are pseudonymous with respect to C
if for any message space M to which C has access, and for which P(v is source |
Q ∈M) 6= 0,
P(u is the source of Q | Q ∈M)
P(u is the source of Q)
=
P(v is the source of Q | Q ∈M)
P(v is the source of Q)
.
We allow the possibility that a coalition has non-trivial prior information on
the probability that user u wishes to evaluate query Q. In our analysis we focus
on the case where this information is limited, and users cannot be identified
by their queries alone. The next result follows directly from the definition of
pseudonymity, but we record it since we will have use for it in later sections.
Lemma 1. Pseudonymity with respect to the coalition C is an equivalence re-
lation on the users of a UPIR scheme.
The coalition C can resolve the identity of a user u if and only if u belongs
to a pseudonymity class of size 1 with respect to C. Users u and v maintain
pseudonymity with respect to C after arbitrarily many requests have been ob-
served if and only if they lie in the same pseudonymity class. We propose the
following definition for security.
Definition 4. Let (Vi) be a family of UPIR schemes indexed by i ∈ N, where
the number of users in Vi is ni. We say that Vi is secure against coalitions of
size t if the pseudonymity relation of any coalition of size t contains a giant
component, i.e., the union of all other components has size O(n1−i ) for some
 > 0. The family (Vi) is secure if for every t there exists N ∈ N such that Vi
is secure against coalitions of size t for all i ≥ N .
Informally, we consider a UPIR scheme to be secure if any coalition of size at
most t can observe only a negligible portion of the system. Equivalently, for any
fixed coalition C of bounded size a randomly chosen subset of users, of limited
size, will be mutually pseudonymous with respect to C with high probability.
Our first result is that families of PBD-UPIR schemes are never secure.
Theorem 2. In a PBD-UPIR scheme, a single eavesdropper can resolve the
identity of any user who makes sufficiently many linked queries. Equivalently,
for any coalition of eavesdroppers, every pseudonymity class has size 1.
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Proof. Suppose that u makes a series of linked queries. An eavesdropper c will
observe a subset of these queries in the unique message space M shared by c and
u, and will never observe linked queries in any other message space to which he
has access. Since users do not write queries addressed to themselves1 c will be
able to identify u as soon as he has observed a linked query addressed to every
other possible user in M . Provided that u follows the requirements of Theorem
1, c will observe the required queries with probability 1.
In fact, a pair of collaborating users c1 and c2 can identify u far more quickly.
If c1 observes a query in the message space M1 and c2 observes a linked query
in M2, then the collaborators can conclude that the source of the requests is a
user in M1 ∩M2. But in a PBD-UPIR scheme, such a user is unique. This is
called an intersection attack in [9]. Theorem 2 can be easily modified to identify
all users in any UPIR scheme in which every pair of users share at least one
message space. In particular, all of the UPIR schemes proposed by Swanson and
Stinson to circumvent the intersection attack are still vulnerable to Theorem 2;
although it will take more linked queries to identify the source.
To protect against the attack outlined in Theorem 2 we suggest using a
different incidence structure that we will introduce in the following section.
3 Generalised Quadrangles
In this section we introduce generalised quadrangles (GQ). For the sake of com-
pleteness, we include proofs of some well-known results, for further reading
see [7]. We will show that the bipartite incidence graphs of generalised quad-
rangles have diameter 4. So in a UPIR scheme derived from a GQ (GQ-UPIR
scheme in short), a pair of users either shares a message space, or there exists a
third user sharing message spaces with each of the first two. As a result, when
users communicate along a shortest path, a message is written to at most 2 mes-
sage spaces. In this section, we use the usual language of incidence geometry; in
a GQ-UPIR scheme, users are labelled by points and message spaces by blocks.
Definition 5. A generalised quadrangle is an incidence structure containing
points and blocks in which two blocks can intersect in at most one point, and
which satisfies the GQ Axiom: given any point x and block L that does not
contain x, there is a unique point x′ in L that shares a block with x.
Even though we are dealing with an abstract incidence structure, there is
a natural representation of this structure as a geometry. It is traditional for
the blocks in a generalised quadrangle to be referred to as lines. Indeed, a
generalised quadrangle is so-named because there are no triangles (three lines
1In fact, Theorem 1 forces users to act as their own proxy equally often as any other user.
Even if users write requests addressed to themselves to message spaces, the combinatorics
of PBDs prohibit such requests from appearing with the same frequency as those addressed
to other users. Sources would hence still be resolvable, though the result would now be
probabilistic.
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intersecting pairwise in three distinct points) but numerous quadrangles in such
a geometry.
Lemma 2. There are no non-degenerate triangles in a generalised quadrangle,
but any two non-collinear points are contained in a quadrangle.
Proof. Recall that a triangle is a triple of distinct lines L1, L2, L3 with pair-wise
non-empty intersections, say xij ∈ Li ∩Lj . Note that x12 is collinear with both
x13 and x23. By the GQ Axiom, if x12 /∈ L3, then there exists a unique point
on L3 collinear with x12: in other words, x13 and x23 cannot both be collinear
with x12, and there are no triangles.
On the other hand, consider two non-collinear points x and y, and consider
two lines L1 and L2 incident with y. The point x in not incident with either
L1 or L2, and, by the GQ Axiom, there is a point w on L1 and a point z on L2
such that x is collinear with both w and z. If the line incident with both x and
z is L3 and the line incident with both x and w is L4, then the quadruple of
distinct lines L1, L2, L3, L4 is the desired quadrangle.
For a point x in a generalised quadrangle Q we write B1(x) for the set of
points collinear with x. By convention, x /∈ B1(x). Suppose that y /∈ {x} ∪
B1(x), and let L be any line through x. By the GQ axiom, y is collinear to a
unique point on L, so y is at distance 2 from x, which we denote by y ∈ B2(x).
In fact, since the choice of L was arbitrary, we obtain a bijection: every line
through x intersects a unique line through y. Hence every point lies on a fixed
number t + 1 of lines. A similar argument shows that all lines have the same
size, which we denote s + 1. The standard definition in the literature is to say
that a finite generalised quadrangle has order (s, t) if there are s + 1 points
incident with a given line and t + 1 lines incident with a given point. Routine
counting arguments can be used to establish the following well-known result.
Lemma 3. The number of points in a finite generalised quadrangle of order
(s, t) is (s+ 1)(st+ 1). For any point x in the GQ, there are s(t+ 1) points in
B1(x) and s
2t points in B2(x).
Proof. There are t + 1 lines through x, each containing s points distinct from
x. Since a GQ contains no non-trivial triangles, these lines are disjoint (outside
of x). So there are s(t+ 1) points collinear with x, and |B1(x)| = s(t+ 1).
Consider now a point y in B2(x). Since y /∈ B1(x), y is not incident with
any line through x; choose such a line L. By the GQ Axiom, y is collinear with
a unique point on L. Since there are s points on L other than x, and each of
these points is collinear with s(t+ 1)− s = st points not on L, there are exactly
s · st = s2t points in B2(x).
The following result, due to D.G. Higman, shows that the parameters s and
t cannot differ by too much, in general.
Theorem 3 ( [6]). In a finite generalised quadrangle of order (s, t), if s > 1
and t > 1, then s 6 t2 and t 6 s2.
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Our analysis of pseudonymity relations in a GQ-UPIR scheme will require
the concept of a hyperbolic line in a GQ, which we introduce now. In a finite
generalised quadrangle Q of order (s, t), given any two non-collinear points x
and y, by the GQ Axiom, there is a collection C of exactly t+ 1 points collinear
with both x and y. Thus there are at least two points, x and y, that are collinear
with all the points in C, but there could be more.
Definition 6. Given a set of pairwise non-collinear points X in a finite gener-
alised quadrangle, we define B1(X ) to be the set of points collinear with each
point in X , i.e., B1(X ) =
⋂
x∈X
B1(x).
We define the span of X to be the set of points collinear with every point of
B1(X ), i.e., sp(X ) = B1(B1(X )) =
⋂
z∈ ⋂
x∈X
B1(x)
B1(z).
When X = {x1, . . . , xm}, we often write B1(x1, . . . , xm) to denote B1(X )
and sp(x1, . . . , xm) to denote sp(X ). Note that, for non-collinear points x and
y in a generalised quadrangle of order (s, t) we have {x, y} ⊆ sp(x, y) and, by
the GQ Axiom, |B1(x, y)| = t + 1. The set sp(x, y) is often referred to as the
hyperbolic line defined by x and y. The following results show that hyperbolic
lines have incidence properties similar to those of ordinary lines.
Lemma 4. If a ∈ sp(x, y), then sp(a, x) = sp(x, y).
Proof. Let a ∈ sp(x, y). Because a ∈ sp(x, y) = B1(B1(x, y)), a is collinear with
each point in B1(x, y). Since B1(x, y) = B1(a, x, y) ⊆ B1(a, x), we have
t+ 1 = |B1(x, y)| = |B1(a, x, y)| 6 |B1(a, x)| = t+ 1.
HenceB1(x, y) = B1(a, x), and therefore sp(x, y) = B1(B1(x, y)) = B1(B1(a, x))
= sp(a, x).
Corollary 1. If |sp(x, y) ∩ sp(w, z)| > 1, then sp(x, y) = sp(w, z).
Proof. Let {a, b} ⊆ sp(x, y) ∩ sp(w, z). By Lemma 4, sp(x, y) = sp(a, x) =
sp(a, b) = sp(w, a) = sp(w, z).
We end this section by collecting relevant information about the families of
classical generalised quadrangles. These families are related to certain classical
groups, and are thus highly symmetric. In each case, the size of spans of sets
of a given type are constant, regardless of which points within the generalised
quadrangle are chosen. In the following table, q is a prime power, and x, y, and
z are three mutually noncollinear points.
4 Secure GQ-UPIR systems
We begin this section by describing in detail the pseudonymity relation on a
GQ-UPIR scheme for a single eavesdropper.
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Table 1: The classical generalised quadrangles.
Q Order Span size
W(3, q), q odd (q, q) |sp(x, y)| = q + 1
Q(4, q), q even (q, q) |sp(x, y)| = q + 1
Q(4, q), q odd (q, q) |sp(x, y)| = 2
Q−(5, q) (q, q2) |sp(x, y, z)| = q + 1
H(3, q2) (q2, q) |sp(x, y)| = q2 + 1
H(4, q2) (q2, q3) |sp(x, y)| = q + 1
H(4, q2)D (q3, q2) |sp(x, y)| = 2
Proposition 1. In a GQ-UPIR scheme using Protocol 1, the pseudonymity
classes with respect to a single eavesdropper c are singleton classes for users at
distance 1 from c, and are of the form sp〈c, u〉 \ {c} for any user u at distance
2 from c.
Proof. Suppose that c observes a series of linked queries; if c shares a message
space with u, then the queries always appear in this message space. Otherwise
by the GQ axiom, for every line through c, there is a unique user on that line
collinear with u. This implies that c observes linked queries from u distributed
uniformly across all message spaces to which c has access. Hence c can decide
whether u is at distance 1 or distance 2.
If d(c, u) = 1, then an argument exactly analogous to that of Theorem 2
shows that c can resolve the identity of u. So suppose that d(c, u) = 2. For
a fixed line M containing c, there is a unique user u1 sharing a message space
with u. Over sufficiently many linked queries, c will observe queries addressed
to every user in M except for x. As a result, c learns X = B1(c) ∩B1(u).
Now recalling Definition 6, suppose that v ∈ sp〈u, c1〉. Then by Lemma 4,
B1(c1) ∩ B1(v) = X . It follows that u and v are pseudonymous. Likewise, any
other user in sp〈u, c1〉 \ c1 falls into the same pseudonymity class.
An easy corollary of Theorem 1 is that a single user in a GQ-UPIR scheme
can resolve the identity of every other user in the scheme if and only if every
hyperbolic line in the GQ has size 2. There are two such families known: Q(4, q)
where q is an odd prime power, and H(4, q2)D. The data given in Table 3 shows
that the pseudonymity relation on a GQ-UPIR scheme will never give a giant
component when using Protocol 1. We introduce a new protocol, inspired by
onion routing, which will be secure against large coalitions of users.
Protocol 2. Let (U ∪M, E) be a GQ-UPIR system. Suppose furthermore that
every user has been assigned a public key, and that user u wishes to retrieve the
response to the query Q from the database.
1. u chooses a user v uniformly at random from the set of all users, and generates
a private key ψ.
2. If u = v, u requests Q directly from the server, receiving response R.
3. If d(u, v) = 1, then user u encrypts both the query Q and the private key ψ
using v’s public key φv, and writes the request [v, φv(Q), φv(ψ)] to the unique
message space that they share.
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4. Otherwise, d(u, v) = 2 and u chooses a shortest path to v, say [u,M1, u1,M2, v].
Message passing is as in Protocol 1: u writes the query [(u1,M2, v), φv(Q), φv(ψ)]
to M1.
5. When v receives the request, he forwards Q to the database, receives response
R and writes the response [(v), φv(Q), ψ(R)] to the message space in which the
query was observed. The response is returned to user u as in Protocol 1.
Remark 2. In Protocol 2, the only user who learns the query Q is the proxy
v; this means that users do not observe linked queries addressed to other users.
The use of a private key is necessary since revealing u’s public key to v would
compromise u’s privacy.
Proposition 2. In a GQ-UPIR scheme using Protocol 2, all users at distance
two from a single eavesdropper c are pseudonymous.
Proof. As in Proposition 1, c can identify whether the source u of a series of
linked queries is at distance 1 or distance 2. Suppose that u is at distance 2.
Then c observes linked queries in every message space to which he has access
with equal probability. Without observing queries addressed to other users
he gains no information about members of B1(u), and so any pair of users at
distance 2 are pseudonymous.
In contrast to GQ-UPIR schemes, it can be shown that encryption of mes-
sages offers limited benefits in PBD-UPIR schemes. In particular, a single eaves-
dropper learns which message space he shares with another user: this means that
there can be no giant component in the pseudonymity relation. It can be shown
that a coalition of three users, not all sharing a single message space, suffices to
identify any other user in a projective plane UPIR scheme. In essence, intersec-
tion attacks do not require coalition members to observe queries addressed to
other users.
Theorem 4. A GQ-UPIR scheme using Protocol 2 is secure against coalitions
of users of size O(n1/4−). Hence any family of GQ-UPIR schemes is secure in
the sense of Definition 4.
Proof. Let c1 and c2 be members of a coalition, and suppose that d(c1, u) =
d(c2, u) = 1. Write Mi for the (unique) message space shared by ci and u. An
intersection attack identifies u as the unique user with access to both spaces. We
conclude that the identity of any user at distance 1 from more than 1 coalition
member can be resolved.
Suppose now that c1 is the unique coalition member at distance 1 from u.
Then c1 learns the message space M shared with u. By the GQ axiom, every
other user is at distance 1 from a unique user in M \ {u}. So the coalition gains
information about the identity of u proportional to the number of neighbours
that they have in M . In particular, the identity of u is completely resolved if
and only if every user in M \ {u, c1} is a neighbour of some coalition member.
In this last case, the size of the coalition is at least proportional to the number
s+ 1 of points on a line in the GQ.
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By Proposition 2, the users at distance 2 from every member of the coalition
C form a single pseudonymity class with respect to C. We estimate the size of
this pseudonymity class. By Lemma 3, the number of users at distance 1 from
a single user is s(t + 1). To apply Definition 4, we require |C|(st + s) ≤ n1−
where n = s2t+ st+ s+ 1 is the number of users in the scheme.
Using Lemma 3, we write t = sα where 12 ≤ α ≤ 2. Straightforward cal-
culations show that n = O(s2+α) and that st + s = O(s1+α) from which we
conclude that st + s = O(n
1+α
2+α ) = O(n3/4), where the second equality comes
from α ≤ 2. It follows that when |C| = O(n1/4−), the set of users at distance
2 from C form a giant component in the pseudonymity relation of C.
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